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STUDY OF THE ENTIRE UN MEMBERSHIP QUESTION: US/CHINA POLICY

(Pursuant to NSSM 107)




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
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
by J. Saunders, Nathari Schirtz Council

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




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I. Conclusions and Options for Decision

- 1. The major problems facing us are Chinese Representation (Chirep) and UN membership for the divided states. We are likely to suffer a major foreign policy defeat this year on the Chirep issue if we persist in our present policy. Neither the Charter nor legal analysis furnishes real guidance for formulating a US policy. The issues are and always have been political, not legal. The choices before us are:
- A. <u>Maintain our present policy</u> continue to treat Chirep as a separate problem and deal with admission of the divided states on a case-by-case basis.
- B. Adopt "Universality" attempt to deal with the problems facing us within a single framework by urging General Assembly adoption of a doctrine of universality. Since there are important practical obstacles to the immediate admission of all divided states, we would not necessarily make specific proposals but might state willingness to see them admitted when conditions are appropriate. We would oppose expulsion of the Republic of China (ROC) as contrary to universality, and not oppose perhaps even advocate Communist Chinese (PRC) entry.
- C. Adopt "Universality" plus a Dual Representation resolution on China follow a universality resolution of the above type with a resolution calling for seating of both Peking and Taipei as a solution to the pressing Chinese representation issue within the universality context.
- D. Adopt Dual Representation Alone propose a dual representation resolution on China without the universality framework. A number of variations are available, some more desirable and/or more saleable than others.





- 2. Maintain our present policy: The ROC will strongly urge that we take this course and will resist any other choice. But doing so is likely to lead to early passage (this year or 1972) of the Albanian Resolution seating Peking and expelling Taiwan. It therefore involves the greatest potential loss of prestige for the US. (Curiously, this option least jeopardizes improvement in relations with the PRC -- who also see it as leading to their early victory.)
- 3. Adopt "Universality": The concept of universality has much to recommend it: it is supported by the great majority of UN members, would appeal to domestic and international public opinion, and might help stem the tide in favor of the Albanian Resolution. But espousing universality would cause us difficulties in our bilateral relations with the ROC, the ROK, and the FRG (in addition to the PRC). It would not by itself settle the China issue. Even if it were specifically invited to come in, Peking would almost certainly refuse to do so while Taiwan remained. It is more likely that the UN would eventually yield and eject the ROC, than that the PRC would yield and accept seating alongside the ROC.
- 4. A Combination of "Universality" plus a Dual Representation Resolution on China: This is the formula most likely to head off defeat on the Chirep issue, in the short term at least. Placing the dual representation resolution within the philosophic basis of universality improves its chances for passage by making it more difficult to attack. Should the PRC refuse to enter on this basis, even though it would have been specifically invited, the onus would be on them, and the ROC would remain a member (unless it decided to withdraw see paragraph 7 below). In the long run, however, the same considerations about a contest of wills noted in paragraph 3 above would apply.
- 5. <u>Dual Representation Alone</u>: The Chirep problem could be dealt with independently by offering a dual representation resolution without universality as a philosophic cloak. This course would have less appeal in the General




Assembly, but would avoid the problems with the Koreans and probably the Germans which universality would raise. Such a resolution would stand a good chance of commanding majority support in the General Assembly and blocking the Albanian Resolution and would be seen as a realistic and forward-looking policy. However, it also would have the problem of durability mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 4 above. Taiwan doubtless would argue that it would prefer to withdraw from the UN rather than agree to dual representation (see paragraph 7).

decide whether to press the Important Question again. By dropping the Important Question, we probably could easily pass a dual representation resolution by a simple majority -- but it could later be overturned by a simple majority. If we go for the Important Question and the Important Question passes, we would have to get a two-thirds majority for dual representation, which seems rather doubtful. On the other hand, if we were able to get a two-thirds majority, dual representation would be established on a reasonably durable basis. Our decision on tactics should be made after an assessment of the situation later in the year, and in consultation with our allies.

A dual representation resolution probably would have to express the view that the Security Council seat should go to the PRC since this is in keeping with Assembly sentiment on the issue. However, we could and should attempt to explore other possibilities of keeping that aspect open. The Security Council, regardless of any specific Assembly recommendation, would probably decide to award the China seat to the PRC following Assembly action to seat Peking.

7. If the ROC remains adamantly opposed to dual representation and consequently withdraws from the UN before or after adoption of a dual representation






proposal, our objective of preserving a place for it in the UN obviously would have failed. A carefully organized effort would be required to persuade the ROC that withdrawal would be against its interest, and there is no assurance that this effort would succeed. At the same time, we should recognize that the security of Taiwan depends primarily on the US defense commitment, which would not be affected, and not on UN membership. Taiwan's economy would not be directly affected by loss of UN membership.

- 8. It has been occasionally suggested that the US also has the option of opposing the Albanian resolution, but in a relatively pro forma manner -- assuming that since we are bound to fail, we should cut our losses and involve our prestige as little as possible. We believe that the ROC would view such a stance as conspiring in its ejection from the UN and thus as a breach of good faith and that passage of the Albanian resolution, over even passive US opposition, would still be seen as a serious American defeat. Accordingly, it appears that this option would be less attractive than it initially might seem to be.
- 9. PRC membership would be troublesome to us and to the UN. However, the PRC probably would not try to wreck the organization and could not even if it tried.
- 10. Microstates, insurrectionary regimes, irredentist organizations, etc., do not pose unmanageable problems to universality. Southern Rhodesia might be a theoretical problem, but in practice the UN would find ways of excluding it as long as its present racial policies continue. No state currently recognizes its sovereignty.
- Il. Whether or not we strike out on a new path, close consultation with a number of countries is required. After the RCC itself, Japan most urgently requires consultation on Chirep.





- a. If we go the universality route, we must also consult closely with our German, Korean, and Vietnamese allies. ROK interests probably cannot be entirely reconciled with our own, but compromises satisfying some of their most urgent requirements are possible. In the case of the FRG, difficulties need not arise provided the US maintains the position agreed by the Foreign Ministers of the US, UK, France and the FRG on December 2, 1970 (see Section V).
- b. If we opt for dual representation, we must expect a period of major difficulties with the ROC, and it is possible that they would be of such a magnitude as to cause us to reconsider the choice of that policy option.

II. Introduction to the Problem

We have been asked to study the question of UN membership in its totality. There is only one urgent problem, that of Communist China, but another is not far behind -- East Germany which is already being pushed forward by the USSR. (The other divided countries, Korea and Vietnam, are not pressing matters.) If we adopted universality as a broad, philosophical approach to membership questions generally, this would give us a tactical advantage; but it would entail some cost in our relations with individual countries, particularly our Korean allies. No problem need arise with the FRG if we maintain the position agreed by the four Foreign Ministers (see Section V). If we depart from this position, we would have to expect a sharp FRG reaction.

On the Chinese Representation (Chirep) issue in the UN, the trend is clearly against us. Although we obtained a majority on the Important Question (IQ) resolution at the 25th General Assembly, support for the IQ will be subject to accelerating erosion. If we continue on our present course, the Albanian resolution





will pass before lone. There is little doubt that a strategy looking. I acceptance of the principles of universality and dual representation for China would be better calculated to prevent or delay the expulsion of the ROC than our present policy. However, there are risks and pitfalls to every policy option. These are analyzed in this paper.


Curiously, if our overriding interest is in laying the Chirep issue to rest, to improve the prospect for relations with the PRC, and yet to remain faithful to our ally on Taiwan, it might be best to continue with our present policy and see the PRC admitted to the UN over our opposition and even at the expense of expulsion of the ROC. However, this would involve a major American defeat on an issue of world importance.

If we chose to go down to defeat on the Albanian resolution, the US Government would be widely regarded as wrong-headed, static, inflexible, and unrealistic -- even though it might be pursuing a carefully calculated policy of the lowest aggregate of liabilities abroad. There would also be a political price to pay for the fact that the US Government was suffering a major defeat at the hands of the Communists. It is clear, therefore, that a rational calculation of international advantages and disadvantages is not sufficient for the choice among policy options. Domestic political considerations must play an important part in the decision.

III. Basic Facts

A. UN Membership and Overall US Policy

Entry into the UN of the PRC and of the other communist states that are not presently members would have an immediately unsettling effect on the organization. On balance, however, their entry could be beneficial to the UN's substantive work in some areas (cf. Section VII below and Annex F). Many pressing international problems,




(e.g., pollution, narcotics traffic, seabeds jurisdiction, hijacking) can only be dealt with effectively on a truly world-wide basis -- hence the attractiveness of universality as a principle for the United Nations. In other areas, such as peacekeeping, the new Communist members might be a very disruptive element.

However, much we would like to see the United Nations made more effective, this is not the overriding objective of American policy. Our policy objectives toward the UN must be in phase with our national security requirements and thus have to take into account the power relationships as they exist in the "real" world. We therefore suggest that our choice of policies on membership in the UN must be influenced to a substantial degree by the answers we give to these questions:

- (1) How strongly do we desire improved relations with the PRC? Can our behavior and tactics at the UN significantly foster such an objective? (Our overall China policy is discussed in NSSM 106.)
- (2) How important is continued ROC membership to us -- not in terms of what the UN can do for the ROC or of what the ROC can do in the UN, but in terms of the American interest in Taiwan? (See Section VI and NSSM 106.)
- (3) What difficulties would the espousal of universality entail for our relations with South Korea and West Germany? How important is it to us to avoid those difficulties? (Some of their problems are sketched in Section V below and are detailed in Annexes A and B.)

Unless we factor in the answers to such questions, which to some extent transcend the bounds of this study, we risk a situation where the UN tail (and specifically the Chirep tail) might be wagging the national security dog.






B. <u>Utility of a Unified Doctrine of Concept</u> on Membership

The United States would be performing a political and dialectical feat of the first magnitude if it were able to move from its present policy on Chinese representation -- now widely regarded as sterile, negative, static, and dommed to failure -- to a stance on universal membership which would be acclaimed as realistic, liberal, and non-restrictive. Should the PRC refuse to come into the UN on such a basis, which is likely at least in the foreseeable future, the onus for its exclusion would be shifted from the US to the PRC. At the same time, we would be rid of the considerable liability of having to draw so heavily, each year, on diplomatic capital which could be put to better use in soliciting the support of friendly countries on other issues.

Espousal of the admission of all divided countries into the UN would be seen as a serious effort to write finis to a chapter on the Cold War. It would constitute tacit acknowledgement of the Communist conquest of the respective portions of the divided countries, although we would make it clear that their admission would not prejudice eventual reunification by peaceful means. There would be many difficulties in the case of Korea and possibly Germany, analyzed in Section V below. In Vietnam, there would be some beneficial fall-out from any UN policy to promote the membership of both portions of that country since this would tend to promote the position of the GVN that there are two states, one of which is engaging in aggression against the other.

With respect to China, a stance in favor of universality would move that problem to a higher plane, widening the focus and appearing to deal with it on a basis not of expediency but of a principle that is inherently appealing to almost everyone except Peking and Taipei (cf. Section VI). By transferring a policy focussed on one country into one of world-wide application,



we would have found a doctrine to which we could cleave for a long time, regardless of what other countries might do and regardless of any future vagaries in the UN.

In terms of American prestige, we would be trading the prospect of a humiliating defeat on the Albanian Resolution for the prospects of a fair-sized majority in favor of a new policy under which both contestants could be seated. Should the PRC enter under that principle, it would not be happening against our will. The chances of the ROC retaining a seat in the UN would be somewhat enhanced by passage of a universality resolution, but they would not by any means be guaranteed. It would set the stage for passage of a dual representation resolution on China which would be an application of the universality principle.

The foregoing may make it appear that universality is an open-and-shut affair, with almost nothing but advantages. This is far from being the case. While the advantages are evident, the disadvantages are less so. They are brought out in succeeding sections of this paper.

C. What the Charter Says About Membership

The UN Charter does not speak of universality. In Article Four, the Charter limits membership in the UN to "peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations". The mechanism for admission is also specified: The Security Council must recommend that the applying state be admitted, and the General Assembly must approve that recommendation by a two-thirds majority.

In point of fact, all states without exception describe themselves as peace-loving, and the Council has never applied that criterion in rejecting an applicant.





Similarly, since 1955 the fact of having made application for membership has been taken as prima facie evidence of ability and willingness to assume the obligations of the Charter (even when, as in the case of some micro-states, this clearly was not so). As interpreted, therefore, the Charter poses no operative limitation and furnishes the barest minimum of political -- not juridical -- admission criteria.

There is also nothing in the Charter that prevents a divided country or nation from being represented by two governments: The Charter does not speak of countries or nations, but only of states and uses that term in a special sense. Furthermore, acceptance as founding members of two constituent republics of the USSR has obscured the juridical significance of "states" in terms of membership.

D. Why the US has Departed from its Original Position Favoring Universality

The original US proposal for a post-World War II international organization envisaged that it would be based on the principle of universality. This was slightly tempered in 1943 by acceptance of a British proposal that "peace-loving" be established as a criterion of membership (directed against our then common enemies, pending their reform). Various other limitations were proposed at the San Francisco Conference in 1945, but Article 4 of the Charter as adopted imposed only minimum conditions on admission of new members.

When eight membership applications came before the Security Council in 1946, the US proposed the admission of all of them in order to accelerate the advance toward universality of membership -- even though we had misgivings about some of the applicants, notably Albania and Mongolia.

However, when the USSR vetoed admission of some members (Ireland, Jordan, and Portugal) we voted against





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admission of those the Soviets sponsored. (We did not have to use the veto because the Soviet proposal failed to get the necessary support.) Subsequently each side in the Cold War opposed the admission of friends and clients of the other side, until the package deal of 1955 resulted in the admission of 16 new members simultaneiously. A smaller package was voted in on the same basis in 1961.

Since that time, the only issue has been that of seating China, which has been cast in terms of who should occupy the existing seat of one member, and has been a General Assembly issue, not a Security Council issue. Neither the Security Council nor the General Assembly has had the admission of any of the divided states on its agenda since 1958. With only slight oversimplification, it can be said that the departure from the original concept of universality was due to the Cold War. The argument over whether the PRC was "peace-loving" was not at the heart of the issue, though it was prominent in the rhetoric.

E. The Chirep Question

At the heart of the Chinese Representation tangle lie the claims of both the PRC and the ROC to be the sole legitimate government of all of China, and thus to represent "China" in the UN. Both maintain that Taiwan is not an independent or separate political entity and therefore cannot be independently or separately represented in the UN. The PRC regards UN membership as its unquestioned right, wrongfully denied, as the successor government of China since 1949, and rules out any possibility of applying for admission as a new member. For the ROC, UN representation supports its claim to be the only legitimate Chinese government and therefore buttresses the structure of government on Taiwan (including the virtual mainlander monopoly of the central government organs). Thus the ROC too would refuse to consider applying for admission as a new member. Both governments have denounced dual representation.






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The Republic of China, as an original signer of the United Nations Charter, is one of the founding members of the UN. It is mentioned by name twice in the Charter: In Article 23 which provides that the "Republic of China" shall hold one of the five permanent seats on the Security Council; and in Article 110 on ratification of the Charter. However, to argue that the permanent seat on the Security Council belongs to the ROC because of its name, rather than to the entity China, would run counter to logic and to the intention of the signers of the Charter.

Based upon its claim to be the only legitimate government of China, and its contention that the Republic of China ceased to have legal existence after October 1, 1949, the PRC argues that it automatically and by right succeeded to China's UN seat on that date. The Chirep question in their view is not a question of "admission" to the UN or of "membership". Through the Albanian Resolution, the PRC seeks <u>restoration</u> of its lawful rights in the UN, recognition of its representatives as the only lawful representatives of China, and expulsion of the ROC as a usurper. The ROC has also argued its case on the basis of representation and not membership.

In meeting the challenge of the Albanian Resolution, the US has mobilized (1) majority support for a procedural resolution affirming that any resolution to change the representation of China is an "Important Question" requiring a two-thirds majority for adoption, and (2) opposition to the Albanian Resolution itself. In so doing, however, the US has not argued in recent years that the ROC is the sole legal government of China (though the ROC would wish us to do so). In any case, this argument clearly would have little appeal in the Assembly.

For many years we argued that Peking was not qualified for membership. The PRC's action in Korea and attacks on the UN gave point to our arguments. More recently we have placed our major emphasis on




arguing against "expulsion" of the ROC. We have based our (and the ROC's) case on political and membership grounds, and have intentionally elided the <u>legal</u> and <u>representational</u> issue (which government is the legal government and representative of China), since only the political argument was likely to persuade the Assembly to keep Peking out and Taiwan in. We have also wished to keep open the possibility that Taiwan might some day sit in the UN in some other capacity than as representative of even a part of "China".

We must recognize that for many states espousal of the doctrine of universality would not necessarily entail acceptance of the idea that there should be two Chinese delegations. Countries could vote in favor of universality as a principle of UN membership, and yet vote that the PRC is entitled to the seat now occupied by the ROC, which in practice would "expel" the ROC from the organization. This would be regarded by those countries as a by-product of the factual situation that the ROC does not represent China. In other words, even general adoption of a liberal policy on universality of UN membership would not necessarily work a solution to the problem of Chinese Representation.

F. Chirep in the Security Council

If the Assembly votes in favor of PRC membership, whether on a dual representation basis, through universality, or in some other fashion, the PRC would not automatically accede to the Security Council -- Assembly resolutions are not binding on the Council -- but this action would set in motion pressures that likely would make it an almost inevitable concomitant. Even if Communist China refuses to come into the UN as long as the ROC was in it, we would therefore not be able to offer the ROC much hope that they could stay in the Security Council after the Assembly had voted a dual representation resolution.






Actually, the PRC might get on the Council even prior to General Assembly action on Chirep, since only 9 votes out of 15 in the Council may be required for that purpose. (There is no "Important Question" procedure in the Security Council.) If it came up as a challenge to the credentials of the ROC representative, the proposal to seat the PRC probably would be viewed as procedural and not subject to US or ROC veto: If nine members of the Security Council feel strongly enough to vote that the ROC is not entitled to sit on the Council, then there may also be enough votes in favor of the position that the matter is not subject to veto even over our objections. For this to happen, there would have to be a Security Council President favoring the seating of the PRC (and there are several whose turn will come in the course of a year). In such a case the Security Council President would rule that the vote had been on a procedural matter and thus not subject to veto; and if we challenged the ruling we would have to have nine votes to overturn it. On the other hand, if the Security Council President ruled the matter was not procedural. the PRC's supporters would have to get 9 votes to overrule that decision.

Nevertheless, it is possible to make efforts to handle dual representation in the Assembly in such a way as to preserve at least the possibility that the ROC would remain in the Security Council as long as the PRC refused to come into the UN. That aspect is discussed further below, under dual representation.

IV. Micro-States and Other Problems

We have for some years sought to have the UN exercise its responsibility to determine the "ability" of applicant states to carry out Charter responsibilities. Our efforts to obtain some form of associate status for Micro-states have obtained virtually no support, and





unless the US is prepared to exercise the veto, no practical impediment to Micro-state membership is likely to emerge.

Although a universality doctrine would tend to weaken the rationale for our use of the veto or other forms of opposition to full Micro-state membership, we could probably take care of this problem by coupling a call for universality with reiteration of our position favoring associate memberships for Micro-states based on our view that the UN must, under the Charter, determine if an applicant is both willing and able to accept the responsibilities of membership.

The question is sometimes raised whether universality would enhance a claim to UN membership by entities such as Sihanouk's FUNK, or other exile or insurrectionary bodies. These are essentially conflicting claims to be the rightful government of a state, rather than claims to admission as a new member. While credentials challenges will continue to arise from time to time, they will lead to the Assembly accepting one and rejecting the other, not to seating both claimants.

The case of the Communist "Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Viet-Nam" is a somewhat different matter. It is quite conceivable that given a proposal to admit both North and South Vietnam, the Soviet Union might argue that the PRG is the rightful government of South Vietnam and should be admitted as such. In this case, as in any instance in which admission is proposed of an entity to which we would have objection, we will have to mobilize friendly votes and if necessary use our Security Council veto.

On the other hand, the Government of Southern Rhodesia could receive some additional claim to acceptance into the organization as it is a functioning (if unrepresentative) government in effective control




of its territory. This would be a purely theoretical claim, however, Southern Rhodesia has been proclaimed an "illegal" regime. The UK claims sovereignty over it, and no state recognizes Rhodesian sovereignty and in view of its racial policies, there is no chance whatever that a majority would be found to vote for its admission to the UN in the foreseeable future.

V. Problems which a Universality Resolution Poses Vis-a-Vis Germany, Korea, and Vietnam

- 1. Germany. The FRG has abandoned its claim to be the only government authorized to speak for the German people abroad and has in fact proposed eventual UN membership for the two German states. The problem is thus no longer one of principle but one of timing. However, for reasons that are very important to the FRG as well as to ourselves, any acceptance of East Germany into the UN should be made dependent upon:
 - a. a satisfactory settlement in Berlin;
- b. conclusion of a <u>modus vivendi</u> regulating relations between the FRG and the GDR (which the FRG insists must be different from relations between "foreign" states); and
- c. some reaffirmation of quadripartite rights and responsibilities with regard to Germany as a whole.

The Foreign Ministers of the US, UK, France and FRG on December 2, 1970, approved a joint document providing for accomplishment of these three objectives prior to GDR admission to the UN. Failure to obtain the foregoing would be severely damaging both to the FRG and to the US (and its Western allies). It could result for instance in a situation where the GDR could utilize its status as a sovereign UN member to prejudice our position in Berlin; and the Soviets could





point to such GDR membership as a further reason to decline responsibility for GDR interference with Allied access and other rights.


We have a veto on East German entry into the UN, but endorsement of the principle of universality could lead to problems in the specialized agencies and at international conferences. The main difficulty that might be anticipated with the FRG would not stem from the concept of universality, but rather from a US endorsement which did not also specify the special considerations which would have to apply in the case of the GDR.

2. Korea. If we espouse a policy of universality there would be difficulties with the ROK of a magnitude as large as, and perhaps larger than those that followed the withdrawal of 20,000 of our troops last year. Since the founding of the ROK, its foreign policy has been based on the fact that the ROK is recognized by the United Nations as the only lawful government in (not of) Korea. Admission of North Korea to the UN would not only deprive the ROK of its preferred international status, but it would do so without North Korea having altered its adamant opposition to UN involvement in the Korean question.

There would also be repercussions on the military arrangements in South Korea. The UN Command, which has given us operational control of the South Korean forces, would perhaps be on a shakier basis than before -- although it could not be abolished without our consent in view of the US veto in the Security Council. In any case, we would have to consider placing the relationship between US and ROK forces on a new basis.

Although there will probably never be a really good time to make the policy change in question, early 1971 would create great problems. Our decision to





reduce 'our authorized troop strength in Korea from 63,000 to 43,000 spaces has produced an extremely strong reaction. Coming on top of this a change in our UN policy would have further internal repercussions in South Korea, especially if it would come on the eve of the May presidential elections. To avoid accusations that he was not properly defending Korea's interests, President Park would undoubtedly feel it necessary to take a very strong public position against any doctrine which would result in the admission of North Korea to the UN on equal terms with the South.

3. Vietnam. Though it would have qualms about Hanoi gaining UN membership, the Republic of Vietnam (GVN) probably would go along with an American decision in favor of universality. Its first reaction would probably be to prefer the status quo, under which the GVN has an observer mission in New York and is a full member of a number of UN agencies, while Hanoi has no UN status. With US persuasion, however, the GVN probably would see UN membership for both Vietnamese states as confirming the existence of two separate sovereign states and as underscoring the point that North Vietnamese actions against the South constitute international aggression.

Hanoi, on the other hand, may be expected to resist separate membership under universality or any other cloak. The North Vietnamese leaders would see admission of both states as increasing the prestige and legitimacy of the GVN at the expense of the Communist PRG. They would also fear increasing pressures toward an "international" solution of the Vietnamese conflict, in contrast to their desires for a "Vietnamese" (i.e., Hanoi-controlled) solution. Hanoi is thus likely to insist that the UN membership question must await a final peace settlement. The Soviet Union probably would adopt the same position, although it proposed the admission of both Vietnams in 1955.



VI. US Relations with the PRC and the ROC

A. Present US Policy Objectives Toward the PRC.

- (1) Normalize US political and economic relations with the PRC and achieve a relaxation of tensions.
- (2) Allay Peking's fears of US-Soviet collusion against China.
- (3) Deter PRC aggression against its non-Communist neighbors and obtain Peking's acceptance of those nations' independence and non-interference in their internal affairs.
- (4) Avoid a direct US-PRC armed confrontation or conflict and prevent an offensive alliance between Peking and Moscow directed against the US or its Asian allies and friends.

B. Present US Policy Objectives Toward the ROC.

- (1) Encourage peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue between the governments in Peking and Taipei and discourage the use of force by either side in the Taiwan Strait area.
- (2) Meet our commitment to the defense of Taiwan and the Pescardores and our strategic requirements in East Asia.
- (3) Maintain for the government on Taiwan international recognition and support commensurate with its <u>de facto</u> status.
- (4) Encourage the development of more representative political institutions on Taiwan and promote its continued economic growth and contribution to regional development.



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
C. The PRC, the ROC, and the UN -- Premises.

- (1) Any formula calling for representation in the UN of both governments is presently acceptable neither to the PRC nor the ROC because both claim to be the sole legitimate government of China.
- (2) Any formula implying the separateness of Taiwan from the mainland is presently unacceptable to both the PRC and the ROC because both consider Taiwan an integral part of China.
- (3) Because both the PRC and the ROC demand exclusive representation rights for China, neither is likely to accept the presence of the other in the UN in the foreseeable future.
- (a) The PRC demands the expulsion of the ROC as the fundamental condition for its entry.
- (b) If the ROC were not expelled but had to accept lesser status in the UN, it might withdraw.

D. PRC Interests and UN Membership.

- (1) The PRC considers UN membership to be its by right -- a right wrongfully denied -- and will not apply for admission as a new member. It considers ROC expulsion to be required by and the validation of its claim to be the sole legitimate government of all China.
- (2) Entry into the UN as a result of a US defeat would provide political encouragement to the PRC and raise its hopes of bringing about instability and collapse of the ROC on Taiwan.
- (3) UN membership would provide a useful forum for the PRC to expound its philosophy, project its image on the international stage and oppose the two superpowers.





E. The UN as an Issue in US-PRC Relations.

- (1) US opposition to PRC entry has been a long standing and significant, albeit secondary obstacle to improved US-PRC relations.
- (2) US espousal of universality and/or dual' representation would not improve US-PRC relations in the foreseeable future; in fact, it would have the opposite effect because it would delay the victory which Peking now sees within its grasp. On the other hand, even PRC entry as a result of conscious US policy, while perhaps lessening tensions between the two countries, would not resolve major issues dividing them.
- (3) The US must continue to support and defend the ROC regardless of whether it or the PRC is in the UN, thus continuing a major irritant in US-PRC relations.

F. <u>US Commitments to the ROC on the Chinese</u> Representation Issue.

- (1) No formal and binding commitments exist, but since 1950 successive administrations have assured the ROC that the US would continue to support its "position" in the UN. President Nixon told Vice Premier Chiang, Ching-Kuo in April 1970 and Vice President C. K. Yen in October 1970 that the US would continue to oppose PRC admission into the UN.
- (2) Previous administrations have been more specific. In 1961 we gave the ROC a carefully qualified assurance that, if it is necessary and would be effective, the US would use its veto to prevent the entry of the PRC. This administration has not renewed this assurance, but the ROC nonetheless may argue that we are still bound by it.

G. Effect on US Interests of ROC Loss of Representation.

ROC loss of UN representation could have adverse




implications for a number of US policy interests relative to Taiwan and its future status.

- (1) It would handicap our ability to retain international support for the government on Taiwan and lead to a weakening of its status as a legitimate international entity. This could make our treaty commitment for the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores more vulnerable to PRC challenge as interference in an "internal affair".
- (2) It could prejudice options for support of Taiwan as an independent entity with UN representation.
- (3) It might reduce the chances of persuading Peking to set aside the Taiwan issue in exploring possibilities for improved relations.
- (4) It could reduce the acceptability of the ROC both as a contributing partner with other countries in regional development, in which the US has a continuing interest, and as a source complementing US efforts for technical assistance to developing countries.

H. ROC Interests and UN Membership.

- (1) ROC leadership regards UN representation as important primarily as confirmation of its claim to be the sole legitimate government of all China.
- (2) As a secondary interest, the ROC probably now sees the UN as a useful forum to oppose international recognition of the PRC.
- (3) UN representation also enables the ROC to participate in the work of and draw on the resources of the specialized agencies for Taiwan's development. UN representation, however, probably is not an important factor in ROC bilateral economic relations.
- (4) On the other hand, the ROC does not regard UN membership as important to its security.

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(5) Erosion of the ROC's bilateral diplomatic relations would probably be accelerated if it were no longer represented in the UN, and this might occur more rapidly if it were expelled than if it withdrew. In itself, loss of UN representation is unlikely to precipitate a domestic political crisis on Taiwan. The ROC, however, might well calculate that in terms of maintaining inviolate its claim to be the only legitimate government of China and the integrity of the political structure on Taiwan, it would be preferable to withdraw rather than either face expulsion or acquiesce in a dual representation strategy. If the ROC withdrawal were seen by American public opinion as stubborn refusal to face reality (for example, refusal to acquiesce in dual representation), this could reduce public support for our defense commitment.

I. UN Membership as an Issue in ROC-US Relations.

The ROC leadership considers US defense of its present policies in the UN as second in importance only to our security commitment as evidence of the reliability and strength of US support.

- (1) The ROC, therefore, is likely to regard a changed US Chirep policy as indicating a basic shift in our China policy in favor of achieving accommodations with the PRC at the expense of ROC basic interests.
- (2) Although the ROC reaction to such a development is not likely to prejudice US interests which require ROC cooperation, it could seriously affect the over-all tone of US-ROC relations and lessen our ability to influence ROC policy in other areas of importance to us.

VII. Effect of PRC Membership (on the UN and on the PRC)

Peking's entry will undoubtedly have an adverse effect on the functioning of the organization, particularly in the Security Council, on UN peacekeeping, in ECAFE, and the Secretariat. These effects, although troublesome,






seem containable. Indeed, the parliamentary procedures of the organization and the inevitable necessity to use tactics of log-rolling and compromise should have some disciplining effect on the PRC. The PRC will be an obstreperous member of the UN but not to the point of disregarding its own basic interests. We should also note that with the PRC in the UN, we would have, potentially at least, a regular, informal and high-level channel of communication with Peking. This would be an alternative to the Warsaw channel and, because of its relative informality, one which might be easier to use.

Peking's attitude may be similar to that of the Soviets during the early Cold War years. However, given declining US ability to influence General Assembly decisions, the PRC would have a greater capacity for trouble-making than did the USSR. In the Security Council, Peking will not hesitate to use the veto to block any resolutions with which it does not agree. It will try to exacerbate discussions of issues involving "colonialism" and Western "imperialism" and would attack the UN role in Korea. It may be even more intransigent than the USSR on peacekeeping. Even where the US and USSR might agree, such as the Middle East, the Chinese attitude would make consensus on establishing any peacekeeping missions more difficult.

In the General Assembly and its committees, the PRC would have proportionately less leverage, but it would lend further impetus to the existing tendency of many Third World countries to adopt extreme or unrealistic resolutions. Continued passage of such resolutions will further weaken UN credibility, despite the fact that they act as a safety valve for expressions of discontent.

Peking may elect to play by the procedural and traditional rules which the UN has developed over the last 25 years, stretching them as other UN members have





frequently done, but without intentionally trying to undermine the organization. At both the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina and the 1962 Geneva Conference on Laos, the Chinese bargained hard but stayed well within the norms of diplomatic behavior. Peking will probably soon realize that if it expects to acquire effective influence in the UN, it will have to play the parliamentary game in order to keep from being isolated. It is not likely that a majority of the members would allow Peking to destroy the organization or to block action which is generally desired.

The major political reality of the UN situation today is that the so-called Third World countries form a strong majority in the General Assembly and one which is not very susceptible to US influence on issues which they see as their key concern. PRC entry will not significantly alter that situation, but will accentuate it. The UN may become even less effective (in our terms) as a result of PRC entry, but this would be a matter of degree, not kind.

For a full discussion of anticipated effect of PRC membership in the various UN bodies, and the problems created by its role in the Secretariat and otherwise in New York, see Annex F. That Annex also concludes that the PRC is likely to make no smaller contribution to the UN budget than now made by the ROC; that this may lead to PRC interest in the improvement of UN fiscal and managerial procedures; but that sizeable new expenditures will result from its likely insistence that the UN and all its agencies translate everything into Chinese and print documents in that language.

In the unlikely event that the PRC find itself in the UN together with the ROC, it would wage an unremitting struggle for expulsion of the latter. Should the ROC withdraw or be expelled, the PRC will continue to use the UN as a forum to press its claim that Taiwan is a part of China.



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VIII. Universality as a New Approach

There are many types of universality resolutions, but there is no need to consider them all. On one extreme there would be a resolution that merely enunciates and endorses the concept of universality. On the other extreme would be a "package resolution" specifically providing for admission to the UN of the states that are now outside of it.


In practice, a 'package resolution" would buy us more problems than it is worth since we are not ready, for instance, to accept East Germany into the UN until certain conditions are fulfilled. We should therefore think in terms of a resolution that would enunciate the principle, refer to the major states now outside the UN, and express the willingness of the General Assembly to approve their applications when the Security Council recommends them. In other words, the resolution would express the "sense" of the Assembly and would lay a political and philosophic basis for action by the Security Council but would leave it to the Council (where we have a veto) to put policy into practice. The actual wording of the final resolution would be worked out in consultation with our allies -- and in consideration of what is most saleable in the Assembly.

Tactics

We should carefully coordinate our efforts with Japan and with those countries (principally Latin American and African) who have been principal advocates of universality in the past. We would need to consult the FRG and ROK and seek to overcome their objections. We would also have to coordinate with the UK and France in view of the quadripartite position we have endorsed on the East German question.

The Soviet Union or other states probably would attempt to delete Vietnam while calling for early unconditional admission of North Korea and East Germany.





Given the need for us to set certain preconditions at least in the case of East Germany, we would have to resist these attempts -- but we would have to do so in a way which would not call into question our good faith in pressing a universality resolution.

We must assume that the PRC and its supporters would argue that the ROC, as a "non-state," cannot benefit from universality, and would again table the Albanian Resolution. Therefore, if the universality resolution were not to include an explicit provision for dual representation for China, it would have to be followed by a separate resolution which did. (For specific tactics on handling the dual representation aspects, see Section IX.)

Since it involves membership, a universality resolution would have to obtain a two-thirds majority in the Assembly. If the resolution only enunciated the principle of universality, it would pass by such a majority. To the extent that it was more specific, it would be less supported. If the PRC's supporters worked against it (because it stated or implied that the ROC's status in the UN must be preserved), or if the Soviet Union and its allies opposed it (because it hedged too much about the seating of their East German or other clients), they probably could muster enough votes to block passage of the resolution.

Advantages

- (1) Universality, although it means different things to different members, is favored in principle by a majority in the General Assembly and would appeal to broad segments of American and international public opinion. US support for the principle would be seen as progressive and forward-looking.
- (2) Universality provides a single, easily understood concept for "solution" of membership questions


involving divided states. Linking universality with dual representation provides a philosophic and political basis for seating both Chinese entities without openly contradicting their claims to uniqueness. If the resolution passes, it puts the Albanian Resolution at a tactical disadvantage and makes it easier for dual representation to pass later even if opposed by the PRC.

- (3) Universality is compatible with long-range US security interests. None of the divided states is likely to be united peacefully in the foreseeable future and their unification in present circumstances would not serve US interests. Any attempts to unify them by force would lead to major international conflict. Separate UN membership for each part of the divided nations, which universality would promote, offers the possibility of blunting conflicts and of long-term coexistence.
- (4) If the PRC refused to enter the UN after passage of a universality resolution that specifically invites it to come in, the onus for non-participation would shift to Peking.
- (5) Although the General Assembly could again turn to the Albanian Resolution some support would have been drawn away from it. To the extent that the universality resolution implied Assembly support for the principle of dual representation, the chances of the Albanian resolution would be significantly reduced.

Disadvantages


- (1) US advocacy of a resolution expressing willingness to admit the divided states when recommended by the Security Council or even a non-specific universality resolution would be viewed with misgiving by the ROK and if not carefully worked out, by the FRG.
- (2) The PRC would oppose any attempt to have Taiwan benefit from a universality resolution in any





form and would regard US advocacy of it as being just as hostile as our present opposition to the Albanian Resolution. This would militate against any early improvement in US-PRC bilateral relations.

- (3) The ROC might refuse to cooperate even if universality, or universality and dual representation in combination, were seen as the only way to preserve its representation in the UN. A US decision to persist in the face of their opposition might seriously strain our bilateral relations. The ROC would certainly threaten to, and might actually withdraw from the UN, leaving the field open for PRC entry.
- (4) Should a crisis in US-ROC relations occur, we would also suffer the liability particularly among some of our Asian allies of seeing ourselves accused of acting against the vital interests of an ally as it sees its vital interests.
- (5) Passage of a universality resolution even if followed by dual representation, probably would not be a final solution of the Chirep problem. If the ROC remained in the UN, the Albanian Resolution would probably continue to be tabled in subsequent Assemblies and would still have to be contested. It is much more likely that the Assembly would bow ultimately to Peking's pressure and pass the Albanian Resolution, than that Peking would accept entry prior to ROC expulsion.
- (6) Although a general universality resolution would not actually commit the US to support all membership applications under any circumstances, it would limit maneuverability and would put us on the spot, for instance if East Germany applied for admission, in which case we would have to explain carefully our seemingly inconsistent opposition to such an individual application. On the other hand, if we coupled our support for a general resolution with a policy statement indicating the conditions that must be satisfied before we could actually support the admission of the GDR, this would make the resolution less attractive.



IX. Strategies for Dealing with Chinese Representation

A. Dual Representation Strategies

The many available types of dual representation resolutions fall into the following general categories. (NOTE: The headings are used only as an aid to memory—the actual resolution need not employ the descriptive heading. For a full discussion of the comparative merits of the different types of resolution, see Annex D.)

- (1) "One China One Taiwan," affirming that two sovereign states now exist and should be represented as full members (the Security Council seat probably going to the PRC);
- (2) "One China Two States," affirming that although China is conceptually one nation, two political entities now exist and, pending other arrangements should be separately represented with respect to the tecritory and people each controls (the Security Council seat probably going to the PRC);
- (3) "One China Two Delegations," a variant which makes no mention of the existence of separate political entities but calls for seating two separate delegations, one PRC and one ROC, to represent the single entity China;
- (4) "Two Delegations" a variant which makes no mention of whether there is one state or two but simply calls for seating two delegations one PRC and one ROC.
- (5) A resolution which invites the PRC to sit in the Assembly (and probably the Security Council) representing the people and territory under its control. It might make no mention of the ROC and therefore assume its continued seating in the Assembly representing the people and territory under its control.





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'(6) A resolution which invites the ROC to continue to sit in the Assembly as a member representing the territory and people under its control, but makes no mention of the PRC, assuming others would table a resolution on PRC entry.

All of these variants have in common seating the PRC through General Assembly action and would expect the Security Council seat to go to Peking whether that is explicitly stated or not. All take their legal basis in successor state theory, and all preserve a place in the Assembly for the ROC without further admissions procedures, except for "One China - One Taiwan" which might require ROC application as a new member, though this might be finessed by an Assembly decision to ignore the legal problem.*

All dual representation resolutions will be opposed by both the ROC and the PRC. Of the five, however, Peking as well as Taipei would object most strongly to the "One China - One Taiwan" formula which takes a definitive position on Taiwan's separation from the mainland. "One China - One Taiwan" is thus the least likely to succeed, even aside from the fact that it might imply a requirement for Security Council (hence vetoable) action on separate ROC UN membership.

The PRC and the ROC might object least strenuously to the "One China - Two Delegations" variant but this formula is most vulnerable to the argument that it contradicts the language of Article 18 of the Charter,

Some variants (particularly the "Dutch" resolution) would have the Security Council take simultaneous action to seat the PRC and admit Taiwan as a new member. These would depend upon Soviet (and French) cooperation -- an unlikely eventuality.





providing that each member of the Assembly shall have one vote. (However, that article speaks of "each member", not each state, and in any case the Charter's language did not prevent the participation of two constituent republics of the USSR.) This formula technically would imply recognition that Taiwan is part of China (hence our assumption that Peking would object least strenuously to it). The US has reserved its position on this point since 1945.


Of the dual representation formulas remaining, numbers two (a similar formulation was suggested by Belgium in 1970 but never formally tabled) and four would have the following advantages: they would work well in conjunction with a universality resolution to which they would seem a natural extension; they are clear and disposative while five and six work by implication; they could be drafted so as to limit somewhat Peking's scope for objection, and yet not foreclose options for the future of Taiwan (by being vaguer, four leaves the question even more open than two). are thus probably more saleable and durable than the other formulas as far as the General Assembly is concerned. Finally, passage by the Assembly of any dual representation resolution which expressly provides for continued seating of the ROC, would make it considerably more difficult, though not impossible for the Assembly later to pass the Albanian Resolution.

Tactics - General

NOTE: A final decision on the tactics to be used at the 26th General Assembly should be made at a much later date, and only after a fuller assessment of the likely voting situation and after consultation with our allies. Our intention here is only to point out the types of tactical decisions we will face.

Should a policy decision be made to seek a dual representation resolution, it should be in full awareness that we would be heading into a period of great difficulty





in our relations with the ROC. The ROC would attempt to persuade us that they would withdraw from the UN in case a dual representation resolution is voted, and we would attempt to persuade the ROC that such a move was against their interests. Should we become convinced that the ROC would make good its threat, we would be confronted with a decision whether to persevere even at the cost of our relations with the ROC when the practical outcome would be the entry of the PRC on its own terms. (For a fuller discussion, see Annex G.)

As far as the General Assembly is concerned, a dual representative resolution would probably have greater appeal following passage of a universality resolution. We would need to consult and carefully coordinate our efforts with key allies, particularly Japan. We must assume that the Albanian Resolution would again be tabled; Peking and its supporters would work hard to secure a majority for it and to defeat dual representation. This would require major diplomatic efforts on our part in capitals and in New York in support of dual representative -- with or without a preceding universality resolution -- and against the Albanian Resolution.

In terms of immediate effect, it may be preferable not to introduce the Important Ouestion resolution again if we go the dual representation route: the IQ would rule out adoption of the Albanian Resolution by a simple majority, but would also require a two-thirds vote in order to approve dual representation. We might be better off tactically to seek priority for the dual representation resolution, take our chances on having it passed by a majority (a likely but not sure outcome), and then seek to have the Assembly decide "not to vote on" the Albanian Resolution (Rule 93), and if it were voted on we could claim it required a 2/3 majority as being a reconsideration of a decision already taken (Rule 83). If we pursued this tactic, we would be hampered to a certain extent by its inconsistency, with our position






on the IQ in previous years. The main advantage of this approach is the high probability of a majority vote for dual representation the first year it is introduced. Its main weakness is that a decision taken by a simple majority can be overturned in the future by a simple majority. A decision by only a small majority would be unstable, therefore.

Although Peking's supporters have called the IQ procedure illegal when applied to the Albanian Resolution, they might well press to have a dual representation resolution require a two-thirds vote. Given the voting situation in the Assembly, we would have to argue against the two-thirds rule in this case despite our past advocacy of the IQ. We could do so on the grounds that, unlike the Albanian Resolution, expulsion was not involved in a dual representation resolution.

Alternatively, we could once again attempt to employ the IQ resolution ourselves, calling for its equal application to both the Albanian Resolution and the dual representation resolution. Assuming we could get the IQ passed, the most probable result would be that both resolutions would fail to get a two-thirds majority, but we would have to make a fuller assessment later. This inherently unstable situation is not likely to continue very long. Subsequent Assemblies would show a swing to one or the other resolution, which would then tend to snowball. Long-range predictions are tenuous at best, but we judge that under these circumstances the swing is more likely to be to the Albanian Resolution. The chief advantage of adoption by a two-thirds vote would be that once so adopted, a two-thirds vote could be required for reversal -- and the US probably could maintain a blocking third against such a motion. Its chief weakness is the uncertain prospect of adoption by a two-thirds vote the first year.






Tactics - The Security Council Seat

Should a dual representation resolution specifically provide for seating the PRC on the Security Council in place of the ROC? The chances of gaining ROC acceptance of a dual representation formula are slight at best; they decline still further if the resolution is to award the Council seat to the PRC. Given this ROC attitude, we might well conclude that it is probably best to make no mention of the Security Council seat in the dual representation resolution and attempt to set this question aside.

However, the Assembly probably would regard as unrealistic any dual representation formula which did not award the Security Council seat to the PRC. If we were to sponsor a dual representation resolution which did not do so, we would probably face an amendment from the floor explicitly providing that the PRC should have the Council seat. If we fought such an amendment, we might undermine the chances for passage of the resolution as well as our bona fides in seeking an acceptable solution to the Chirep problem. Nevertheless, in consultation with our allies, we should explore the possibilities of attempting to keep the issue open.

We must also face the fact that once a dual representation resolution is passed by the Assembly -- with or without explicit provision for seating the PRC on the Council -- the credentials of the ROC Council representative are more likely to be challenged. This could occur even if (as is very likely) the PRC refused to enter the UN on the basis of a dual representation resolution. We could attempt to hold off Council action at least until Peking signifies its willingness to enter on the dual representation basis. We must recognize, however, that pressures for rejecting the ROC credentials would be very strong. This could well lead to a situation in which the ROC representative is expelled from

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


the Council, even if the PRC refuses to come in, and the seat remains vacant for a time at least. This we judge to be the most likely outcome. There is also the possibility that the Council would confirm its willingness to seat the PRC but would not expel the ROC until Peking signified its willingness to join the UN. The disposition of the issue might well depend upon the particular composition of the Council at the time, whether the Soviet Union wished to press the matter, etc.

Advantages

- (1) Dual representation is a reasonable and realistic solution to the Chinese Representation problem. It is favored in principle by a majority in the General Assembly and would appeal to broad segments of American and international public opinion.
- (2) Introduction of a dual representation resolution at the next Assembly would probably draw votes away from the Albanian Resolution. This might be the only way to block passage of the Albanian Resolution at the 26th General Assembly, and thus preserve a seat for the ROC.
- (3) Certain dual representation resolutions offer special advantages: they can be drafted so as to appear relatively favorable to the PRC and thus do slightly less damage to US-PRC bilateral relations, especially by leaving open various options on the future status of Taiwan.
- (4) Passage of a dual representation resolution would put the Assembly on record as to how it wishes to see the Chinese Representation issue settled. This would place Peking's supporters at a tactical disadvantage if they attempted to have the Albanian Resolution passed at a subsequent Assembly since it would mean overturning a past Assembly decision which had expressly provided for ROC seating.





- (5) If the PRC refused to enter the UN after a passage of a dual representation resolution, the onus for non-participation would shift to Peking itself.
- (6) If the Assembly stood firm on dual representation over time, there is the theoretical possibility the PRC might ultimately decide to bow to the views of the international community and enter the UN even with the ROC present.
- (7) Even if we consider that the Assembly eventually would turn again to the Albanian Resolution after having passed a dual representation resolution, the intervening period would offer time to explore other possibilities for solution.

Disadvantages

- (1) The PRC would regard US advocacy of dual representation as just as hostile as our opposition to the Albanian Resolution. This would still be true, though to a slightly lesser extent, if the "Belgian Resolution" formula were used. Neither would brighten the prospect for an early improvement in our relations.
- (2) Passage probably would not be a final solution of the Chirep problem. The Albanian Resolution would continue to be tabled in subsequent Assemblies and would still have to be contested. If Peking continued to refuse to enter the UN on the basis of dual representation, it is more likely that the Assembly would bow ultimately and pass the Albanian Resolution than that the PRC would eventually yield and come in.
- (3) The ROC would refuse at least initially to cooperate in any dual representation strategy, even if this were seen as the only way in which to preserve its UN status. A US decision to persist in the face of ROC opposition would seriously strain our bilateral relations. The ROC would threaten to, and might actually withdraw from the UN if a dual representation resolution were passed leasing the field open for PRC entry.

` (4) Should a crisis in US-ROC relations occur we would also suffer the liability among some of our Asian allies of seeing ourselves accused of acting against the vital interests of an ally -- as it sees its vital interests.

B. Continuing on the Same Course

(1) Description

The course of action probably involving the least uncertainty is that of continuing our present concentration on seeking adoption of the IQ resolution and defeat of the Albanian Resolution, and discouraging introduction of and voting against other proposals (e.g., dual representation, "single-paragraph" resolutions, or phrase-by-phrase voting on the Albanian Resolution). Given the current trend in UNGA voting on Chinese representation and the expected increase in bilateral recognitions of Peking, this strategy is essentially a temporizing exercise which seeks to delay ultimate defeat. The attractiveness of this strategy must be judged not by the chances of its success, which are slight, but by its relative costs or advantages as compared with those of other policies.

(There is a related strategy which might be called "passive approach": we would maintain our present policy of co-sponsoring the IQ and voting against the Albanian Resolution, but we would neither vigorously press the one, nor vigorously oppose the other. This would be done on the assumption that since we are bound to fail, we should cut our losses and not commit too much prestige.)

(This approach has a number of major disadvantages, and upon reflection the advantage is seen as relatively small. In terms of our relations with the ROC, it would create almost as many problems as



not fighting the Albanian Resolution at all; the ROC would view "the passive approach" as conspiring in their ejection from the UN, and thus as a breach of good faith. In addition, regardless of whether we exert ourselves much or little, the US is still clearly identified as the main protagonist of the policy of keeping Peking out and Taipei in. Rejection of the IQ and passage of the Albanian Resolution, even over only passive opposition from the US, would thus still be seen internationally and domestically as a serious American defeat. The loss of prestige therefore would be almost as great as if we had actively led the fattle against the Albanian Resolution.)

(For these reasons, we see, on balance, no advantage in the "passive approach" (though we note that Peking would privately applaud such a decision) and will not consider it further.)

(2) Tactical Handling

If this strategy is to be successful in staving off defeat, we must either (1) prevent further erosion in support for the IQ, or (2) reverse the simple majority vote on the Albanian Resolution. We would need once again to undertake a vigorous and early effort in capitals if there is to be any hope for success even in the short term. With an active campaign we might be able to achieve adoption of the IQ in the 26th General Assembly; the prospects are dimmer for reversing the vote on the Albanian Resolution. Ultimately, and probably no later than 1972, the Albanian Resolution would pass.

We would be handicapped by the fact that a number of UN members now expect us to pursue a new course and are apt to be unsympathetic to what they would regard as American inflexibility. We would need to put great stress once again on the theme of opposition





to the expulsion of the ROC, rather than on opposition to Peking's entry, in arguing both against the Albanian Resolution and against other proposals that would have the same ultimate effect. This strategy need not necessarily be inconsistent with a universality posture, provided the latter is broadly stated.

(3) Advantages

- (a) Vigorous pursuit of this strategy would be the most conducive to maintaining good US-ROC relations, would appeal to several other Asian anti-Communist allies, and would minimize foreign and domestic criticism that the US had weakened in its support of the ROC.
- (b) In contrast to dual representation or universality alternatives, this strategy would be the least damaging in terms of evolving US-PRC relations. Peking would not be surprised if we continued our present strategy, might even prefer that we do so in the expectation of our defeat, and would clearly prefer it to US endorsement of a "two Chinas" proposal.
- (c) In contrast to all other strategies, this course of action, if it led to early passage of the Albanian Resolution as is likely, would settle the issue of who represents China in the UN once and for all. After passage of the Albanian Resolution, Chinese Representation in the UN would cease to be an outstanding issue in US-PRC bilateral relations and would eliminate the yearly expenditure of diplomatic capital required to maintain UN status for the ROC.
- (d) It has the fewest adverse implications, for the other "divided" states in the UN.

(4) Disadvantages

(a) Given current trends, the strategy is likely to be of very short term viability -- probably not more than two years at best. It might even fail at the next General Assembly.



- (b) In the event the strategy failed, it would result in substitution of the PRC for the ROC throughout the UN system. Once expelled, it is extremely doubtful that the ROC could be re-admitted to the UN since Peking would exercise a veto in the Security Council.
- (c) In the absence of US support for dual representation, states that strongly favor PRC membership but oppose ROC expulsion may support or acquiesce in the Albanian Resolution as the only means of achieving PRC representation.
- (d) PRC entry via the Albanian Resolution would boost its prestige and be seen as a serious defeat for the US attributed to inflexibility and unwillingness to go with the times, with adverse effects on US prestige abroad and domestic public opinion.

